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0. Introduction. The thesis we exanaine here is that the 
phonological rules and the syntactic rules in the gr8Jlllllar of a natural 
language work independently, and that all the linguists who have proposed 
some kind of "iuterpenetration" between the two domains have been in some 
degree mistaken. We are interested in a1·ticulating the strongest version 
of this informally stated position that C8l1 be couvincingly maintained, 
and in conducting a critical examination of essentially all the 
linguistic literature we are awl:lre of that contains arguments against our 
position. 
Why we think it is important to do this will be explained in the 
next few sections, but first we must state more exactly what it is that 
we oppose. 
The simplest explication of what the syntactic and phonological 
parts of a gra,mnar are supposed to do would say that the syntactic 
componeut determines the order in which words may he placed in sentences 
and the granunatical structures associated with particular orders and 
combinations of words, and the phonological component determines what 
pronunciations are associated with particular structured sequences of 
words that the syntax says are well-formed. Although we think this simple 
explication is basically correct, the trouble with it is that it 1118kes 
our position sound like a truism, as if no one could possibly disagree 
with it. But in fact dozens of linguists have disagreed with it, 
especially since interest in the precise specification of the form of 
gl"8JIUJlars and the interaction of their rules first became a dominant 
featu1·e of linguistics in the late fifties, and bwidreds of descriptive 
problems have been exhibited whose solutions seem at first to involve 
violations of our thesis. 
The problematic classes of data we are referring to are those that 
suggest that facts about how a word is pronounced are influencing the 
operation of the rules that determine gr8JOlllaticality. Mo1·e teclmically, 
they suggest that certain syntactic rules have to make reference to 
properties of linguistic wiits that receive their interpretation in terms 
of phonetic predicates. We wish to argue that in such cases, appearances 
are always misleading, and in fact no syntactic rule ever refers to a 
phonetically defined property. 
Eveu when our view is expressed in these slightly more technical 
tenns, it may sound rather self-evident. Katz and Bever (1976, 28n), for 
inst8l1ce, suggest that phonetic conditiouing of deletion rules ought to 
be ruled out in principle as a matter of philosophy of science: 
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... there should be meta-principles that detenoine the kinds of 
empirical eve11ts a formal structure ill the grawmar can be associated 
with. For exw11ple, it might be claimed that semantic correspondence 
pri11ciples can 011ly connect grmnmatical formalis1ns to language 
universal cognitive structures, while phonological correspondence 
pri11ciples n1ust often link gr8JIIJDatical formalisms to language 
specific articulatory configurations. Further, there ought to be 
constraints that deterJOine conditioJJs under which the same fonnal 
structures can be referred to by different kinds of correspondence 
principles. For insta11ce, it would clearly be absurd if 011e 
principle connects ellipsis to the operation of erasure 
transformations as in most discussion, but another principle allowed 
mapping rules that correlate phonetic structures with physiological 
properties of the vocal tract to apply prior to such erasures. 
Yet it is not the case that such "clearly absurd" practices as 
assigning phonetic structure like intonation contours at a derivational 
stage that precedes the application of deletion transformations have 
seemed absurd to everyone. Bresnan (1971), Langacker (1970), and Pope 
(1971) all argue for analyses that involve exactly Lhis kind of 
interpenetration of syntax and phonology, while maintaining that deletion 
is a purely syntactic matter. It is our intention to examine the 
arguments and evidence that lead to such analyses, and to formulate the 
closest empirically supportable approach to the view that Katz and Bever 
take on aprioristic grounds. 
Iu this article we make our maiu proposals explicit, locate thew 
within the larger fabric of linguistic theory and metatheory, and sketch 
our strategy for defending them. Section 1 specifies that we are 
investigating the theory of granunars, not a theory of the linguistic 
activities of individuals or groups; the enterprise is linguistic in a 
narrow sense, not psycholinguistic or sociolinguistic. Section 2 
introduces the iriterface prol{rBJII 'for the theory of grammar, within 
which our specific proposals about the interaction of syntax and 
phonology are situated. According to the interface progrmn, a 
grmmnar is composed of a number of autonomous components, interacting 
with one another in limited ways. In the course of this discussion we 
state both the hypothesis that is our main object of interest, the 
Principle of Phonology- Free Syntax (PPFS), end also an important related 
hypothesis, the Principle of Superficial Constraints in Phonology. 
Section 3 exBlllines putative counterexWJJples to the PPFS. We first 
sketch the set of components we asswne in addition to syntax and 
phonology. Fleshing out the idea that syntax end phonology are 
independent of one another leads us to propose a fairly rich collection 
of components that can be said to lie "between" syntax and phonology. 
And finally we provide a taxonomy of apparent violations of the PPFS. 
1. Languages, gr&Jlllars, and speakers. For the most pert, we are 
following a large corpus of assumptions about linguistic analysis and 
theory that has emerged from a quarter century of generative grammatical 
work aud the long tradition of' language study preceding it, and we have 
little to say about metatheoretical issues like the relations between 
linguistics end the psychology of language. However, we ere clearly 
- 65 -
presupposing a great deal already in speaking of "granunars," "languages," 
"rules," and so 011; we therefore make a few remarks of a methodological 
nature here. 
To begiu wlth, we must make it clear that we do not regard the study 
of hwnan language as identical or reducible to the study of the organism 
that uses it. A straightforward reading of some of the statements of 
generative grammarians who have talked about "the rules of mental 
computation" (Chomsky and Lasnik 1977) and "the biology of granooars" 
(Lightfoot 1982) might suggest that not everyone makes such a 
distinction, but we believe that in practice virtually every serious 
student of linguistics does and must make it. 
It is commonplace to agree that properties of the hwnan organism 
such as its striking limitations of short-tenn memory or its 
susceptibility to speech production errors musl be omitted from the 
idealized model of hwnan behavior relative to which we evaluate 
linguistic theories. A theory of English grananar and semantics that 
characterizes (1) as gremJnatical, end true of the sequence "85327," is 
not generally taken to be false simply by virtue of the fact that English 
speakers appear bewildered when they are confronted ,-1ith (1). This, if 
it is accepted, is enough to establish that there can be facts about what 
speakers do with their languages that are not facts about those languages 
themselves. 
(1) The 7 follows the 2 that the 3 that the 5 that the 8 precedes 
precedes precedes. 
It is, of course, quite difficult to tell from raw data of 
acceptability whether we have hit upon an indication that some rule of 
grammar is in effect or whether we have discovered some regularity in 
what the speakers of the language actually do in certain situations. But 
if we keep very clearly in mind what we mean by the terms "language," 
"granunar," and "speaker," though there will still be occasions on which 
we are uncertain about matters of fact, we will at least not be tempted 
into the incoherence that results from failing to distinguish the study 
of languages from the study of language users. 
A language is a specified collection of objects (sentences), each of 
which is a structured sequence of other objects (words) and each of which 
has associated phonological and semantic properties. A grananar is soine 
algebraic construct interpretable as a definition of such a collection . 
A granunar, in the broadest sense, constitutes a theory of the logic of 
the relation between the meanings and the syntactic and phonological 
forms of the expressions of the language. Like any theory, a graJ11D1ar is 
not something that can be located in time or space. And this is all the 
more true of a language, since it exists only as the collection whose 
membership is defined by a particular grmM1ar. 
Speakers, however, exist in space and time. They have lifespans, 
sizes, birthdays, whims, beliefs, and imperfections. It ought to be very 
clear, therefore, when we have stopped talking about the abstract system 
of a language or a grmnmar and begun talking about the speakers of a 
language and what they do. But in fact many proposals have been advanced 
in linguistics that involve a failure to make this distinction. Perhaps 
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the inost notable is the development of the theory of "variable rules" by 
Labov (1970, sec. 2). If a speaker of a la11guage in which the copula is 
optionally 01aissible chooses to omit it in 63% of cases when talking to a 
stranger and in 95% of cases when talking to friends, that is a 
potentially interesting fact about the speaker's interaction patterns, 
but it is not a fact about the la11guage or the grannoar in our terms, a11d 
cannot be. It concerns a speaker who interacts with other people at 
specifiable times in definite locations and chooses one alternant rather 
than another with some detenninate frequency . 
Bickerton {1971) and Gazdar (1976), among others, have correctly 
criticized the theory of "variable rules" for building such notions into 
the grBJD1Dar. The point here is not that linguistic variation lacks 
system or structure, or that theories of variation are impossible; 
rather, the claim is that several distinct, but interlocking, theories 
are needec.J if we are to make sense of what happens when people talk . 
The reason we stress the distinction between granauars and speakers 
at this point is that important decisions mac.le below will depend on it. 
In particular, we will need to draw a distinction between rules of 
grammar and tendencies in dealing with a wide variety of sets of 
facts; and we will need to distinguish rules of grB111J11ar from other 
regularities in the linlfUistic practices of speakers. 
The statement of a rule of gr8DllJJar will be algebraic, not 
statistical, and will concern the definition of abstract objects that 
have no temporal or spatial existence. The stateruent of a tendency will 
have the exactly converse properties, being a statistical statement about 
actual language users in real situations. The statement of a linguistic 
practice might be statistical or algebraic, but in either c&He it 
requires essential reference to situations of utterance or to the 
intentions of interactants, usually to both; see Morgan ( 1978) and Green 
(1982) for arguments that statements about linguistic practices should be 
distinguished from rules of gr8JIIIDar. 
Consider, to illustrate these points further, the influence of the 
unlikely category of chronological age on grmmnatical agreeJllent . 
Consider first the case of Hindi. As the age of a person increases, it 
gets more and more likely that others will refer to that person by means 
of the plural pronoun wee rather than the singular pronoun woo in 
Hindi. But this turns out to be because chronological age is (in 
general) correlated with respect, in the sense that greater respect ( in 
the special linguistically relevant sense at least) is shown to the old 
than the young within the Hindi-speaking culture. The grBDUDatical device 
of using plural concord features is exploited in Hindi as a kind of 
surrogate honorific system. 
We would say that the correlation between the age of a person and 
reference to that person by means of a plural pronoun represents a 
tendency, uot a rule (because the regularity is statistical), and a 
linguistic practice, not a rule of gr8Jlllllar (because a contextual factor, 
the age of the person referred to, is a term in the regularity, and 
because en intention on the part of the speaker, to express respect for 
the person referred to, is a condition on the choice of pronoun). The 
rules of grammar involved, for example, the rule of subject-verb 
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agreement, are concerned with definite, nonstatistical matters like 
whether the features on the verb match those on the subject NP, and 
nobody's age affects them at all. The grammar of Hindi specifies only 
that the two pronouns are among those available in the language, and that 
particular pronouns require agreeing for-ms elsewhere in sentences. 
It is instructive to compare this situation with a related one in 
Achenese (spoken in Indonesia; see Lawler 1977). In Achenese, a verb 
takes a subject agreement inflection determined partly by whether the 
referent of the subject NP in question is younger or older than the 
speaker. While the determination of a person's chronological age is an 
empirical matter, of course, the grammar of Achenese is perfectly clear 
and definite: if the subject NP in a clause is a pronoun from the "older 
than speaker" set, only the "older than speaker" verb agreement 
inflection is grannnatical, and correspondingly for the "younger than 
speaker" set. With nonpronominal subject NPs, the verbal inflection used 
is the one appropriate to the pronoun one would use to refer to the same 
entity (a choice that a communicatively competent speaker will base on 
chronological age insofar as the requisite data is available). But there 
is no tendency for age of a person to affect verbal inflection in 
sentences mentioning that person. Instead, the grammatical rule of 
subject-verb agreement, which is precise and nonstatistical, refers to a 
grmmnatical category which, as a matter of linguistic practice, is 
employed in a way that relates directly to chronological age. 
2. 'lhe interface progrra. l Our model of syntax-phonology relations 
derives from a set of more general assumptions about the nature of 
language structure (and therefore also about the nature of grammars) that 
are familiar from the work of Chomsky. Hale, Jeanne, and Platero (1977) 
provide a convenient summary of what they term the Autonomous Systems 
view of language structure: "According to this view, language consists of 
a number of distinct systems, each possessing inherent principles of 
organization that are essentially independent of factors relating to any 
other linguistic system or to extralinguistic considerations" (379). We 
perceive three distinguishable assumptions here, and although Hale et al. 
speak about "language," the assumptions seem to us to be about the fonn 
grammars must have if they are not to misrepresent the complexity of 
language. 
The first assumption is of .111odulsrity. a grmmnar consists of a 
number of modules; we shall refer to these as COJ/lponents. 
The second assumption is that these components are r10nunifor11, 
distinct from one another in the sense that the representations and 
internal organization appropriate for one component in a grammar will in 
general be different from the representations and internal organization 
appropriate for another. We will make the standard assumption that each 
component functions to relate a small number of types (usually two) of 
linguistic representations, which we will call its te.nainsl 
representstions. 
The third assumption is that each component is sutan01110us, 
independent of all the others, in the sense that aspects of one component 
will not depend upon factors appropriate only to another. What this 
assumption means for grammars is that rules in one component of a grammar 
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cannot be contingent upon representations, rules, or r·ule operations 
available only in another component. Still, the components roust be 
related to one another in some fashion. Assuming that the coruponents are 
autonomous restricts these interactions between (or among) components to 
mediation via their terminal representations, which then serve as 
interfaces between components . 
The asswnptions of modularity, nonunifo11oity, and autonomy 
characterize what we will term the iI1terface progrBJD (IP) for 
grammatical theory. As a research program, the IP has implications 
extending well beyond the question of syutax-phonology interactions. It 
should not in our view be regarded as highly controversial. Much 
theorizing about the nature of gr8J1Dllar in the past half-century has 
implicitly incorporated some version of the IP. 
2.1. Rejections of the IP. We should 1uake it clear, however, that 
the application of the IP in the area of syntax-l'honology interactions 
has been challenged on many occasions by linguists working in a wide 
range of differeut frameworks . Baker and Brame (1972, 54) raise the 
matter rather tentatively: 
It is conceivable that t he Asl'ects theory is incorrect in 
maintaining a strict separation between syntactic rules on the one 
hand vs. morphological and phonological on the other. 2 
Hall and Hall (1970, 49) regard it as clear that as early as 1970 
linguists had found empirical reasons for questioning the separability of 
syntax and phonology (though they cite no references): 
In generative-transformational grammar, morphophonemic rules are 
considered low level rules which are al'plied only after the entire 
cycle of syntactic derivation. However, recently, problems in the 
handling of data from various languages have required solutions 
which call into question the strict hierarchical ordering of rules. 
Hudson (1976, 115) goes yet further, implying that regularities in 
grammar whose statement violates the autonomy of the syntactic and 
phonological components are quite commonplace: 
Interlevel regularities are very easy to find, and can link any pair 
of levels. 
And other writers have gone much further, rejecting the IP quite 
categorically. Thus Hetzron (1972, 251-2) sw1UJ1arizes the main thesis of 
his pal'er in these terms: 
... there are syntactic rules which must apply after some 
phonological information has become available.... [T]here is no 
clearcut boundary between syutax and phonology. There exists a 
certain amount of osmosis between the two domains. 
And siinilarly, Awbery (1975, 24) argues that 
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The interface 1nodel [isJ inadequate. An interlocking model is 
required which will allow phonological rules to reach further back 
in the derivation and mix with purely syntactic rules. The 
syntactic and phonological components cannot, on this view be neatly 
separated out. Instead there is a trHnsition zone in the derivation 
where both syntactic and phonological rules are relevant. 
Tegey (1975, 571) is just as explicit in his claims: 
... a strict separation of phonological from syntactic processes is 
not possible , In fact, ... the usual asswnptions of current 
linguistic theory that phonological processes apply after syntactic 
ones and that syntactic (transfonnational) rules need make no 
reference to phonological information cannot be maintained. 
Rivero and Walker (1976, 100) speak in strikingly similar terms: 
Standard generative approaches to the structure of a grammar require 
that all syntactic operations take place before the application of 
any phonological rules and that phonological considerations do not 
constrain transformations. Evidence has accumulated, however, to 
show that this is too strong a restriction on syntactic rules. 
Syntax utilizes information created by the rules of the phonological 
component. 
An even more extreme claim is that of R. Lakoff (1974, XVIII-40). She 
asserts that in the theory she calls "generative semantics": 
Very simply, there is no separation of levels: a single, highly 
abstract, underlying structure underlies the semantics, the syntax, 
and the phonology, and further, syntactic information may be used in 
the statement of phonological or semantic rules, and conversely. 
And this undifferentiated theory of rule interaction has by no means 
seemed as undesirable to everyone as it does to us . Traugott (1977, 90), 
for instance, appears to regard the position Lakoff takes as both 
desirable and uncontroversially established as correct : 
Particularly pr01Uising for pidgin and creole studies is the fact 
that, in keeping ·\iith some of the most recent work in linguistics, 
dynamic wave theory is based on a theory of language that insists 
that the structures of language can themselves not be forced into 
totally discrete categories. Just as no absolute boundaries exist 
between a trade jargon and a pidgin, none exist between semantics, 
syntax, phonology, and lexicon. 
2.2. Expressive power. Views in which no demarcation at all is 
accepted between (say) the syntactic and phonological componeuts of a 
granonar are relatively far from the center of the spectrum (though not by 
any means unconuuou; we can quote many others in connection with specific 
issues relating to the syntax-phonology interface). In general, however, 
it is clear enough why there have been moves toward abandoning autonomy 
assumptions. Autonomy assumptions are a widely accepted way of 
restricting the expressive power of grammars (a topic we return to in 
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section 2.4.3 below), and thus natural candidates for being relaxed when 
ways are sought to extend such expressive power in the face of empirical 
evidence that cannot be otherwise accommodated. 
A simple example of a move of this sort is the relaxing of 
assumptions about the syntactic and semantic components that introduced 
the variety of transfor10atioual generative granunatical theory known as 
the Extended Standard Theory. Active-passive pairs like Many arrOHS 
didn't hit the target and Tl1e target wasr1 1 t l1it by ma11y arrows were 
perceived to have different understandings. The basic semantic roles of 
arrows and target were uuchanged, but the relative scope of the 
quantifier and the negation eleinent seemed to be different. Therefore, 
relaxing the then-current autonomy asswnption that permitted only the 
deep structure to be input to the semantic f'Ules, it was proposed that 
the deep structure and the surface structure should both be scanned by 
semantic rules (see Chomsky 1972a, 103-6). The analogous relaxing of 
autouomy within generative seioantics was the introduction of derivations! 
constraints sensitive to both deep and surface structure (G. Lakoff 
1971, sec. 2). In both cases, no a priori undesirable weakeniug of 
linguistic theory would attend the relaxing of autonomy assumptions if 
the access to different levels possessed hy different rules could be 
shown to be prescribed on a universal basis; but in fact both Chomsky and 
Lakoff based their arguments entirely on English facts, so in practice, 
though not in principle, their proposals are examples of theory-weakening 
through the relaxation of autonOJBy asswnptions. 3 
Given the possihility of increasing expressive power by removing 
autonomy restrictions, it is possible to regard permeability of the 
syntax-phonology dividing line as an advantage of any theory that 
exhibits it. And, indeed, we find Huddleston (1973, 353) criticizing 
stratificational gr81111Uar, which adheres to the IP and eutails a very 
rigid dividing line between syntax and phonology, and citing the ability 
of TG to handle interlevel generalizations as a positive point: 
Within a TG framework [interlevel] generalizations can be expressed 
by 1ueaus of redundancy rules in the dictionary, but [stratifica-
tional gr8JIIJllar] does not allow for their expression... Examples of 
this ki11d seem to me to present quite compelling evidence against 
the stratificational hypothesis: the theory is baaed on an 
assumptiou of a much greater independence of semantic, gr8JIDDatical 
(or syntactic) and phonological phenomena than can be empirically 
justified. 
Examples Huddlestou cites iuclude the selection of 1110re and 
-er as the comparative marker in English according to the number of 
syllables in the compared adjective and the phonological reduction of 
auxiliary verbs in English when they are not followed by a movement or 
deletion site. We do not regard these cases as constituting empirical 
justification for relaxing autonomy assUJ11ptions; see our discussion in 
Pullum and Zwicky (1984). We see it as esse11tial to permit such 
relaxations only to the ioinimum degree possible. Our strategy, 
therefore, will be to search for potential counterexamples to claims 
inherent in the IP, but also to examine such potential counterexamples 
with care and in detail. What we hope to be able to show is that in all 
the hundrec:18 of cases of putative counterevidence that can be found, the 
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best analysis of the facts is actually compatible with the IP. To the 
extent that this cannot he shown in particular areas, it will be our goal 
to amend the model as conservatively as possible, so as to extend 
expressive power only as far as the facts force us to, rather than 
accepting the counsel of so,ne of the quotes given above and allowing 
interlevel relationships of any sort whatever to be stated by gr811D1latical 
rules. 
2. 3. The PPFS and PSCP. The specifie proposal wi thi11 the IP that 
we are defending is that the theory of grammar prescribes that syntax and 
phonology constitute autonomous components. This is a claim about the 
grammars of all languages. 
But how can a claim of autonomy be defended or attacked? According 
to the discussion in Zwicky (1984), which we will not reproduce here in 
detail, if two components are autonomous, then we expect no forward 
interactions between them, no backward interactions between them, and no 
duplication of principles between them. And we expect them to be 
nonuniform. 
For the syntactic aud phonological components, the hypothesis that 
there are no forward interactions is the Principle of Phonology-Free 
Syntax (PPFS) of Zwicky (1969): 
(2) PPFS: No syntactic rule can be subject to language-particular 
phonological conditions or constraints. 
Although a great many potential counterexamples to the PPFS have 
been put forward, it is our thesis that the PPFS can be maintained in its 
strongest form, which has guided most research on gr811D1latical theory (in 
a variety of theoretical frameworks) during this century and is in fact 
required by other assumptions within certain of these frameworks (as 
we argued in Pullum and Z,dcky 1984). 
For the syntactic and phonological COlHponents, the hypothesis that 
there is no backward interaction is the Principle of Superficial 
Constraints in Phonology (PSCP) of Zwlcky (1970): 
(3) PSCP: The only syntactic conditions or constraints on 
phonological rules are those referring to surface structure. 
Like the PFFS, the PSCP has been subject to many challenges; and 
like the PFFS, the PSCP has guided grammatical research in a variety of 
theoretical fr8Jlleworks, in some of which it is a necessary consequence of 
other assumptions (again see Pullum and Zwicky 1984). Here too we 
maintain that the autono,oy of syntax and phonology can be defended 
against apparent counterexamples; Kaisse (1985) exaJDines a number of 
these. 
Now consider the degree to which syntax and phonology exhibit 
nonuniformity. Several types of principles that are not obviously part of 
syntax--notably, those concerned with the placeD1ent of clitics and with 
the internal organization of morphemes within words- -seea "syntactic" in 
character; i n particular, they often assign hierarchical structures 
analogous to constituent structures in syntax (hence the title, The 
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Syntax of Words, of Selkirk's 1982 book on morphology). On the other 
hand, these very same types of principles also seem to have a 
phonological cast to them: word formation rules can be constrained to 
apply only to morphemes of certain phonological shapes, and (in the case 
of infixation and reduplication at least) they can perform phonological 
operations; cliticization rules are often claimed to be subject to at 
least one sort of phonological constraint (lack of stress), and there are 
phenomena that at first glance look like "endoclitics" (Zwicky 1977), 
parallel to infixes. It is clear, then, that word formation rules have 
some p:r·operties of syntax and some of phonology, and it is at least 
arguable that cliticization rules do too. One ,oight be tempted to 
conclude, therefore, that syntax and phonology are uot totally nonwdfor.m. 
Word formation and cliticization also seem to be ioteractionally 
intermediate between syntax and phonology. Although many problematic 
cases have been put forward, there is at least some support for all of 
the following geueralizations, which locate both word formation and 
cliticization after syntax and before phonology: 
(4) Cliticization after syntax: No syntactic rule must crucially 
apply after some cliticization rule. 
(5) Word formation after syntax: No syntactic rule must crucially 
apply after some word for10ation rule. 
(6) Phonology after cliticization: No cliticization rule 1nust 
ct·ucially apply after some phonological t·ule. 
(7) Phonology after word formation: No word formation rule must 
crucially apply after some phonological rule. 
Like the PPFS and PSCP, these generalizations are by no means 
universally accepted (though we would propose that when (4)-(7) are 
properly formulated, they a:r·e correct). Pt·oposal (4) is implicitly 
rejected in many analyses of clitic phenomena. Proposal (5), the 
Generalized Lexical Hypothesis of Lapointe (1980)--"No syntactic rule can 
refer to an element of mot·phological structure"--was conispicuously 
rejected in early transformational grammar. Proposal (6) goes against 
standard assumptions about phonology and cliticization, which often have 
cliticizatiou contingent on lack of stress. Proposal (7), which prohibits 
word fonnation rules that are conditioned or constrained by derived 
phonological representations, is the ot·thodox assumption of generative 
gr8111111ar, though it is relaxed in level-ordered phonology (Kiparsky 1982). 
2.4. Metaconsiderations. We now collect our metatheoretical 
reasons for favoring the IP, aud for defending the PSCP and PPFS in 
particular: because these assumptions are valuable as part of a research 
strategy (section 2.4.1), because they fit with proposals about the 
nature of the syntactic component (2.4.2), because they can contribute to 
limiting the expressive power of granuoatical theory (2.4.3), and because 
they are compatible with hypotheses about modularity in do1oaios other 
than grammar (2.4.4). 
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2.4 . 1 The IP as a research strategy. A research strategy built on 
the supposition that a gra>Dmar consists of a number of components 
interfacing with one another in limited ways gives rise to a series of 
expectations about the way lunguages work, and so to a series of 
predictions about the correct analysis of phenomena in particular 
languages, while a research strategy built on the supposition that there 
are few components, or that coJOponents can freely interface with one 
another, or both, generates few such expectations and predictions. The 
IP then permits us to entertain, and to test, a variety of hypotheses 
about the components of grammar, most of which would simply be invisible 
given a less differentiated framework. Even the search for uegative 
results about component divisions, as pursued by Anderson (e.g., 1975) 
among others, de10ands that these divisions first be entertained as 
serious possibilities. 
The IP cau then serve as a powerful generator of hypotheses at 
several levels in linguistic analysis. It is virtually certain that some 
of these hypotheses will tun1 out to be incorrect, but we believe that it 
is at least as valuable to have a clear sense of why certain plausible 
hypotheses carmot be maintained as it is to have hit upon a 
collection of proposals that seem at the moment to be supported by the 
known evidence. 
2.4.2 The PPFS, the PSCP, and theories of syntax. It is difficult 
to conceive of a theory of syntax for natural languages which would not 
allow for an analog of the Principle of Phonology-Free Syntax to be 
stated in its terms. Hence the positions we are taking should have a 
very high degree of generality and applicability; if they can be 
convincingly defended, then they will have consequences for any 
imaginable theory of syntax. 
The range of different syntactic theor-ies that have been seriously 
argued for in recent linguistic work is rrunarkably wide; if it is true 
that science is at its healthiest when numerous contending theoretical 
positions are being pursued simultaneously, then the field of syntax is 
visibly healthy. The upshot is that any work that claims to have truly 
general relevance must take account of the possibly distinct claims of 
theories as different as the pure phrase structure syntax advocated by 
Gazdar ( 1982), the more powerful two-level lexical-functional granonar 
(LFG) of Bresnan (1982), and the complexly modular recent versions of TG 
that go under the name of government-binding theory (GB; see e.g. Chomsky 
1981), as well as many other varieties of syntactic theory with smaller 
nuJObers of adherents. 
It is worth keeping in mind that there is a lot these theories 
share. For example, in all of thein some notion of "surface structure" is 
present and is centrally important. For phrase structure theories it is 
the only syntactic structure there is. For LFG it is "c-structure," one 
of the two significant levels of representation for sentences. In GB, it 
is either the output level of the transfonnational component of the 
syutax or a level derived from this by certain operations such as 
deletion rules ( the literature has not been particularly explicit about 
the details). Even in such a strikingly novel syntactic theory as Arc 
Pair Grammar (see Johnson and Postal (1980) for a detailed presentation) 
it has a direct analog, the concept of S-graph. Moreover, many standard 
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labels for nodes, names of uncontroversially accepted lexical and phrasal 
categories like NP (Noun Phrase), VP (Verb Phrase), S (Sentence), and so 
on, are in connnon use in virtually all theories, so at the very least the 
diversity of notions and notations is not total. 
Within certain syntactic theories, the PSCP and PPFS have a special 
status, in that they are consequences of other theoretical assumptions 
and not additional conditions on grBDDDars. Consider "monostratal" 
theories, those positing no syntactic level other than what standard TG 
would call surface structure. Phrase structure approaches like the 
generalized phrase structure grmmnar (GPSG) of Gazdar, Klein, Pullum and 
Sag (1985) are conceptually the purest of these proposals, in that they 
assign the whole burden of syntax to a 10echanis1n already admitted in 
standard TG, the phrase structure rules. Unlike standard TG, a theory 
like GPSG entails both the PSCP and the PPFS in their strongest for.ms. 
The PSCP follows since the surface syntax is the only syntax there is. 
The PPFS follows because the categorial component of the base operates in 
terms of the vocabulary of phrase structure (Le. terminal and 
nonterminal symbols) and offers no possible role for phonological 
primitives. 
It follows that an argument for abandoning either the PSCP or the 
PPFS is also an argument against GPSG and similar monostratal theories. 
Proponents of GPSG consequently have a compelling motive, in addition to 
general roetatheoretical considerations favoring the IP, for supporting 
the PSCP and PPFS. And to the extent that the PSCP and PPFS hold, they 
can be seen as arguments for a theoretical framework (like GPSG, and 
unlike standard TG) in which these principles are necessarily valid. 
There is then an intuiate relationship between the interfacing principles 
and the choice of a monostratal vs. a transformational syntactic theory. 
2.4.3 IS8ues of expressive poNel", A theory with a number of 
components, interfacing with one another in limited ways, is potentially 
more falsifiable than one with few components, free interfacing, or 
both. This is because the former is potentially consistent with a 
narrower range of languages than the latter. To the extent that the IP 
restricts the set of possible languages, it is to be preferred to less 
modular frameworks for grammatical theory. 
We must qualify these claims with "potentially" because whether a 
genuine restriction in the set of possible languages accrues from the IP 
depends on what components there are and what they are like internally. 
There are two caveats to be made here: the general observation (stressed 
by Wasow 1978) that restricting the set of possible grammars does not 
uecessarily reduce the expressive power of a theory of grammar, that is, 
the set of languages that can be (weakly or strongly) generated under 
that theory; and a warning specific to the syntax-phonology interface, 
namely that the empirical consequences of proposals like the PSCP and the 
PPFS depend very much on the character of the syntactic and phonological 
components. 
Does the PPFS actually restrict the expressive power of grammatical 
theory? There are certainly some syntactic theories in which illposing the 
PPFS has no empirical effect at all. Peters and Ritchie (1973) formalize 
essentially the theory of Chomsky (1965) and show that there are no 
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recursively enumerable sets of strings whatever that do not have 
transformational grmmnars as defined by this formalism. (The tecludque 
is to use transformations to mimic the computations of a Turing machine; 
see Bach aud Marsh (1978) for a simpler proof of the same result using a 
rather different technique.) What this means in its starkest form is 
that every languaget attested or imaginaryt is a language with a 
transformational grammar of the sort described in Chomsky (1965) or 
Lasnik aud Kupin (1977); abandoning so1oet or even allt autonomy 
assumptions could not possibly lead to a wider class of languages being 
describable,4 
The imposition of the PPFS will generally make no difference to this 
si tuationt for the proofs of "transfonnational omnipotence"5 generally 
trade on the option of having as many arbitrary new terminals or 
nontenninals as necessary and on the power of deletion transformations. 
If we take any gr811Dllar containing a rule that clearly violates the PPFSt 
we can construct another that generates the same language (weakly and 
strongly) but does not violate the PPFS. 
In fact, a stronger result is easy to prove: if the phonology 
defines a recursive naappingt and the syntactic part of the theory cau 
provide a grmmnar for any recursive sett then for every grBJJUDar that 
violates the PPFS l>y virtue of making a reference in the syntax to sODJe 
recursive phonetic property of constituents, there is an equivalent 
gra11uuar that does not violate it. The proof is straightforwttrd, and we 
merely sketch it. 
Let C be the set of constituents generated by the syntactic 
co1oponent of some gr8Jlllllar G, and let P be the set of phonological 
representations of constituents in C. Without loss of generality, we will 
assume the mapping M from C to Pis a function. Suppose there is some 
recursive subset P' of P whose members meet a particular phonetically 
defined condition. Then there is some subset of C, call it Ct, that is 
mapped onto P' l>y a submapping of M. Since P' is recursive, we can decide 
membership in it. Since the phonological component defines a recursive 
mapping, we can decide for an arbitrary member of C whether its image is 
in P'. This is equivalent to deciding whether it is in C1 hence C' is1 
recursive. But in that case, since the theory provides a grammar for 
every recursive set, we can give a syntax for C' directly. Hence for any 
syntactic rule conditioned l>y a reference to the property of being in P' 1 
we can give an equivalent purely syntactic account that makes no mention 
of P'. 
An example may help for readers who prefer not to view things so 
abstractly. Consider the case of a grammar containing a movement 
transformation that obligatorily moves to the beginning of the senteuce 
the highest constituent that begins phoneticsllywith a bilabial 
consonant. Imagine that the language has an optional rule of vocalic 
prothesis, so that knowing a constituent has a bilabial-initial word as 
its first word at the underlying phonological level is not sufficient to 
detenoine whether it should be moved. This would be a paradiglll case of a 
PPFS violation. Yet by what we have just established, a syntax can l>e 
given for this language within any theory that provides grammars for all 
the recursive sets, in terJDs that do not mention the phonetic property of 
bilabiality, provided only that (i) it is decidable for arbitrary 
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syntactically represented constituents what phonetic representations they 
are assigned by the phonological rules, and (ii) it is decidable for 
arbitrary phonetically represented constituents whether they begin with a 
bilabial consonant. One can hardly imagine a theory of phonology that 
did not guarantee (i) and (ii). 
It might be charged, then, that the PPFS is without consequences and 
so is of no theoretical interest, at least within sufficiently powerful 
theories (for example, any transformational or other theory capable of 
providing grammars for arbitrary recursive sets). One response to this 
charge invokes the "strong mentalist" position on the nature of granunars: 
that the gr81Jlll1ars defined by linguistic theory are actually identical to 
a component of the mind of a speaker of the language, so that any claim 
restricting the number of permissible grammars has empirical consequences 
in cognitive psychology and ultimately in brain neurophysiology. 
Under the strong mentalist interpretation of the subject matter of 
linguistics, clearly, it is not difficult in principle to specify the 
consequences of assuming the PPFS (though it may be in practice very 
difficult to identify them experi111entally). There may be much to be said 
for the idea that granunatical constraints have psycholinguistic 
implications. In particular, we suspect that there may be very 
significant consequences of the PPFS in the domain of parsing: to know 
that the phonetic complexities of speech processing will not be 
implicated in the syntax at arbitrary points in unpredictable ways must 
surely take some potential complexity out of gr811D1latical parsing. But we 
regard this connection as conjectural, and regard the strong mentalist 
interpretation of granunatical theory as somewhat implausible. Linguistic 
theory is surely of some psychological relevance, but to equate the 
specification of graJD1nars for natural languages with the investigation of 
the brains of speakers strikes us as falling into the trap of confusing 
grmmuars aud speakers, which we have warned against above (cf. SoeJOes 
1984 for discussion). 
Another response to the omnipotence argwoent to which we do not 
wish to subscribe appeals to a division of the theory of grammar into 
two parts: a universal gr8Jlllnar UG that determines the class of 
possible grammars and the way they operate, and a system of 
evaluation that ranks potential grammars in terms of "optimality" or 
"simplicity" ... To attain explanatory adequacy the theory T 1nust be 
sufficiently restricted so that relatively few grammars are 
available, given a reasonable 8lllount of experience E, to be 
submitted to evaluation; otherwise, the burden on the evaluation 
procedures is intolerable. A reasonable project for linguistic 
theory, then, is to atteiopt to constrain UG so that potential 
gr8JIIJJ1ars are "scattered" in terms of a measure of optimality; only a 
few granwiars need be considered, given experience. (Chomsky and 
Lasnik 1977, 427) 
In this proposal the evaluation metric would bear a g1·eat part of 
the burden of explaining why we find languages with certain sorts of 
structure and do not find languages with other sorts; both classes of 
languages might be consistent with universal grarrunar, but those in the 
second class would have grammars that score badly on the measure of 
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optimality. Exactly this proposal is put forth by Sampson 1973, who 
supposes that an evaluation metric will sort out the languages in the 
second class as (relatively) "unnatural" because of the complexity of 
their grarumars, as measured by evaluation procedures. 
We wish to reject this line of reasoning on at least two grounds, 
both stemming from the sort of "constructivist" universal grammar that 
Chomsky and Sampson have in min<l in these discussions. In the 
now-standard view, universal grammar supplies a collection of pieces of 
fonnalism fro10 which individual graaunars can be constructed, along with a 
set of restrictions on their combination. The (also universal) 
evaluation metric assigns values to the individual pieces and (by regular 
formulas) to combinations of these pieces. The ultimate function of the 
evaluation proce<lures is to assign a metric of complexity to the grammar 
as a whole. 
The first difficulty arises directly from the latter fact. The 
metric measures the (un)naturalness of the whole grammar; subparts of the 
granunar are assigned measures, but these measures are of no systematic 
importance. As a result, there is no way to speak of an individual 
rule as being either natural or unnatural. Within the constructivist 
framework there is no way to say that a syntactic rule containing 1000 
symbols is highly unnatural (indeed, one ruight want to say it is 
impossible). If a rule containing 1000 symbols were one of only one or 
two rules comprising the entire graunoar, the grammar as a whole might be 
evaluated as no more complex than granonars of quite familiar languages 
with their dozens or hundreds of rules that can be stated fairly briefly. 
Similarly, the framework does not make it possible to say that a rule 
mentioning the arbitrary list { Article, [NP, +Pro, +Ace), [Adv, Manner], 
re/llOnstrate, S', } is unnatural (or impossible). The difference 
between a set of items that must be listed and one that can be picked out 
by reference to some motivated syntactic feature is, from the point of 
view of an evaluation metric, a very small difference--less than the 
complexity contributed by most single rules--so that a gra.a,.earwith a 
rule that includes reference to an unmotivated list will not necessarily 
be rated as particularly complex or unnatural. 
A second difficulty arises from the fact that in the constructivist 
framework there is no intrinsic connection between the parts of a rule; 
anything constructible from the elementary formal units according to the 
principles of combination is a possible rule of grammar. To see the 
sorts of predictions about possible rules and possible grammars that are 
thereby made, take any carefully stated version of a reasonably 
uncontroversial syntactic or phonological rule and construct from this 
original a collection of other possible rules by replacing bits of the 
original by alternatives, and by altering the order of the original 
parts, and by eliminating some of the original parts. The results will 
in most cases be nonsense from the point of view of the grammars of 
genuine human languages, even though they are, strictly speaking, 
well- fonoed rules. Moreover, they are rules of comparable 
complexity/naturalness to the original, given an evaluation metric along 
the lines suggested in the literature on generative granonar. 
We take the view, therefore, that it will not do to adhere to a 
constructivist view of universal graDDDar and so to rely on the evaluation 
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metric to sort out the available granm1ars and possible languages from the 
unavailable grammars and i111possible languages. 
However, it is not necessary for us to adopt the strong mentalist 
interpretation of linguistic theory or to erubrace the evaluation metric 
in order to explicate a sense in which the PPFS can have consequences. 
What is required is a genuine limitation on universal grammar, achieved 
either by restricting its fonnalism (as advocated, for instance, by 
Peters (1973} and by GPSG in general} or by restricting its substance (as 
advocated, for instance, by Bach (1965) end by relational grammar in 
general). In particular, it would be desirable to find a principled way 
of imposing restrictions on the nonter·minal vocabulary of the grBJ11111ar 
(that is, on the set of syntactic categories) which were both formal and 
substantive: a finite bound on the nontenninal vocabulary of universal 
grenonar, and a requirement that every syntactic category be subject to 
substantive constraints as to the role it can play in syntactic rules. 
What this would bar is the ad hoc construction of syntactic categories to 
sunnount descriptive obstacles, or the ad hoc formulation of syntactic 
rules, using motivated categories, for the same purpose. If such uses of 
syntactic categories are excluded, then asswning the PPFS makes certain 
languages undescribable. 
Consider BI1 analogy between grBJfllllars mid Turing machines. The power 
of Turing machines can be seen as arising from lwo sources, the lack of a 
limit ou the nwnber of symbols a machine can work with and the lack of a 
limit on the number of machine states. It is known that limiting Turing 
machines to only two auxiliary states (plus one •accepting state', but 
with no limit on the nl.llllber of auxiliary symbols) does not reduce their 
generative capacity (Shannon 1956), nor does limiting them to only two 
auxiliary symbols (but with no limit on the number of states) (Hopcroft 
and Ullman 1969, 100, citing Wm1g 1957); a reduction in generative 
capacity can be achieved only by limiting both the stock of states and 
the stock of SYJ1abols, so that, speaking intuitively, a Turing machine no 
longer has the unlimited capacity to do scratch work. The excessive 
power of standard TG has analogous sources; transformational grammars can 
do their scratch work either by using some special nontenninal SYJnbols or 
by applying special rules to a fixed nonterminal vocabulary (then 
deleting blocks of symbols used for scratch work), and a reduction in 
generative capacity can be achieved only by limiting both the stock of 
nonterminals end the operations that can be perfot'med on whatever 
nonterminals there are. 
We are suggesting that formal limitations should be imposed, and 
that in addition the limits should be linguistically motivated. If this 
is done, then the PPFS will do just the work we intended it to do. No 
gr8llllllar could then have the effect of making reference to a constituent 
whose first word begins with a bilabial: the PPFS would bar direct 
reference to such constituents, and the constraints on nonterminal 
symbols would bar indirect reference, since the class of constituents 
whose first words begin with bilabials is surely not a syntactic category 
that wiiversal gr8JID8ar would make available 011 other grounds. 
2.4.4 other kinds of -,dularity. The issue of modularity in the 
theory of grBDanar--that is, the issue of whether the logic of the 
relationship between sound mad meaning in language supports the division 
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of the rules describing this relationship into a nwnber of distinct 
components--must be kept distinct from issues of modularity in two other 
domains, psycholinguistics and cognition in general. Nevertheless, there 
are connections between gr8llllllatical modularity and these other types of 
modularity: psycholinguistic modularity could add substantial support to 
the IP, and the IP in turn presupposes general cognitive modularity. 
Consider first the question of modularity in psycholinguistics, that 
is, in la11guage processing (production, comprehension, and memory). It 
is widely assumed that language processing is modular, and Garrett and 
his colleagues have vigorously defended the asswoption of a close 
connection between psycholinguistic modules and the components in a 
grwmuar; Garrett and Kean (1980), in fact, propose that the levels of 
representation in processing and the interface representations in grammar 
are identical. (Note that they do not claim a11y special relationship 
between the internal organization of a psycholinguistic module and the 
corresponding grammatical component.) Verification of this proposal 
would give considerable support to specific models within the general IP, 
although the IP in no way depends upon the existence of psycholinguistic 
modularity. 
Next consider the question of general cognitive modularity, of the 
degree to which there is an autonomous gr8J11Jllar module waong other such 
modules (as maintained by Chomsky in many places and treated at length by 
Fodor (1983)). 6 A commitment to general cogttitive 1oodularity carries with 
it no investtnent in the IP. But those who support modularity in graJmnar 
will also champion general cog11itive modularity, for obvious reasons: If 
there is no distinguishable graJRmar module, how can we discuss whether it 
has autonomous components? With other advocates of the IP, then, we 
assume that granunar is distinct from various extragraJR1natical domains. 
Some pieces of discourse in a language will be bizarre in meauing, 
pointless in context, lacking in grace, hard to comprehend, rude in tone, 
hard to pronounce, metrically regular, devious in inteut, previously 
encountered, novel in form, frequently uttered, or open to multiple 
interpretations, to mention just a few factors assignable to domains 
distinct from (though related to) the domain of gr8111Dlar. But the 
operation of rules in any component of granouar will not depend on whether 
sentences that the rules describe have such properties. There are many 
aspects of the study of language that are distinct from the study of 
grammar; they include studies of the purposive use of language, speech 
perception, speech production, the social "meanings" of linguistic forms, 
discourse organization, stylistics, and poetics. 
3. Putative counterexaaples to the PPl'S. We now sketch our 
strategy for defending the Principle of Phonology-Free Syntax (PPFS). 
The PPFS makes a specifie technical clai10 about gr8Jlllnars, in the 
sense of grm,uaar we introduced in section l above. The claim is that 
none of the rules in the syntactic component of a graaunar refer to 
constructs drawn frOJB the phonological, as opposed to the 
1norphosyntactic, subset of the constructs made available by the overall 
theory of gr8Jlllllar. But the PPFS says nothing about rules in other 
conaponents of a grammar. We must therefore be specific about what other 
components there are and bow they interface with syntax mid phouology; 
indeed, we must be specific about the components falling under the 
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headings .,syntax" and .,phonology ... These matters are the subject of 
section 3.1. Then (in section 3.2) we provide a typology of apparent 
violations of the PPFS. 
3. 1. The caaponents of gr The grmMtatical compouents of 
interest to us include both syntactic components, describing the 
combination and ordering of words in phrases and sentences; and 
phonological components, describing the realization of 10orphosyntactic 
units in terms of phonological units. 
3.1.1. Syntactic components. There is much that we cau leave open 
concerning the structure of the purely syntactic components of a 
grS11Dnar. But what we can be explicit about includes the fact that the 
syntactic components provide (1) a set of representations we shall call 
preterminal structures ,.,hich contain at least categorial, 
constituency, and liuear precedence informatiou, but not the content of 
particular lexical entries; and, derived directly from them, (2) a set of 
representations called terminal structures which contain all the 
above information plus an indication of ,.,hich particular lexical items 
occur in the represented sentence. 
Thus, to take a very simple case, if the syntax is asswned to 
involve just a phrase structure grammar as in Gazdar (1982), the 
preterminal structures are trees with immediately preterminal nodes--and 
thus most of the feature detail associated with the items in the 
sentence, though not the information distinguishing between words 
belonging to the same syntactic category-- and the terminal structures are 
similar trees, but have indices or names of particular syntactic words 
added under the pretenoinal nodes. Thus Birds eat and Birds 
drink might have identical pretenninal structures but distinct terminal 
structures. This emouuts to a claim that the difference between eat 
and drink is not a syntactic difference. 
By distinguishing between preter10inal and terminal structures, we 
avoid reproducing much of the content of the lexicon of a language in its 
syntax. Pretenoiual structures are, speaklug strictly, the output of the 
syntactic component; the syntax then is not responsible for providing 
features to distiuguish between every pair of words the language happens 
to have in its lexicon. However, we also need a level of .,syntactic., 
representation at which (for instance) Birds eat and Birds drink 
are not the same. Terminal structures differ from prete11ninal structures 
only in this respect; they can he viewed as preterruinal structures 
with pointers to words entered in the lexicon, but of course without any 
of the content of those lexical eutries. 
One further distinction needs to be mentioned here because it leads 
to a series of apportionment problems involving syntax and the lexicon. 
This is the distinction, in what we shall call "classical TG., (cf. 
Jacobson and Pulluru (1982, Editorial Introduction)), between cyclic 
and postcyclic syntactic transformations. Claasical TG assumes a 
component division here, both because of limited interactions (no cyclic 
rule applies after a postcyclic rule) and also because of nonunifonoity 
(cyclic rules are bounded, potentially lexically governed rules 10aking 
reference to grammatical relations but not to linear order and applying 
in cyclic fashion, while postcyclic rules are potentially unbounded, 
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lexically ungoverned rules making reference to linear order but not to 
granuoatical relations and applying in a single pass; cf. Pullwu (1979, 
chs. 2 and 4)). Consequently, in standard TG there is an interface 
representation--sometimes called shallow structur~-between the two 
components, which is presumed to be a grBDD11atically significant level of 
representation . 
Virtually all current versions of generative granunar (whether 
transformational or not) make some distinction reminiscent of the 
cyclic/postcyclic distinction, but they differ in just where the line is 
drawn, how the difference is represented, and what significance is 
attributed to the interface representation (if any is defined). This is 
not the place to conduct a detailed review of the matter, but we have to 
consider one possibility, namely that (some or all of) the traditional 
cyclic rules are to be replaced by 0 lexical 0 analyses. 
Consider a rule like the Dative Movement of classical TG, which has 
been regarded as cyclic. There are two quite different proposals for a 
lexical alternative to such a rule. The first denies that there is any 
generalization to be made about the relationship of two classes of 
structures (for instance, transitive VPs containing a to-dative and 
ditransitive VPs). Instead, particular words are subcategorized according 
to which frames they occur in, that is, according to the points in 
preterminal structures at which their indices can be inserted. A Dative 
Movement verb, on this analysis, is one that has two independent lexical 
features, one indicating that the verb occurs in a VP frame with a NP and 
a PP with to, the other indicating that the verb occurs in a VP frame 
with two NPs. A second lexical treatment of a cyclic rule posits the 
same subcategorization features in the lexicon as the first treatment, 
but declares that these features are not independent of one another--that 
there are principles predicting some features on the basis of others--and 
that these principles belong in the lexicon rather than in the syntactic 
component. On this analysis, a Dative Movement verb has both of the 
subcategorization features, the occurrence of one of them (let us say the 
ditransitivity feature) being predictable from the occurrence of the 
other. 
The general class of principles relating features within lexical 
entries we refer to as lexical illlJ)lication principles, or LIPs; they 
are known as lexical redundancy rules in the TG literature. In 
general, the existence of such principles does not depend on how the 
traditional cyclic rules are to be treated. That is, there is a 
component of LIPs (which we can think of for the moment as being 0 in the 
lexicon"), and it might be that some, or all, of the traditional cyclic 
rules can be eliminated in favor of principles in this component. 
In standard TG a particular class of phenomena involving lexical 
government might be best described by independent subcategorization 
features in lexical entries, by an LIP distributing subcategorization 
features in lexical entries, or by a cyclic transformational rule 
triggered by a rule feature in lexical entries. A similar apportionment 
problem arises in GPSG, where the role of a cyclic transformational rule 
can sometimes be filled by a metarule (a principle predicting one class 
of phrase structure rules on the basis of another) and where both 
i ndependent subcategorization features and LIPs are available. That is, 
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in standard TG and in GPSG, both syntactic and (two kinds of) lexical 
analyses can be framed for certain pheJ1ome11a that might on first 
acquaintance be viewed as "syntactic". Finally, in more stringently 
lexicalist frameworks, sucb as LFG, only the two types of lexical 
analyses are permissible in such cases, and no syntactic component can be 
appealed to for an account of the facts. 
The PPFS bars any syntactic rule in which items subject to the rule 
are picked out by phonological predicates. In TG terms, it prohibits 
phonological determination both in phrase structure rules and in 
transformational rules; ueither the class of verbs subcategorized for the 
frame [__NP pp[to NP]] nor the class of verbs subject to Dative 
Movement can be picked out phonologically. In GPSG terms, phonological 
determination is impossible both in rules and in metarules. But the PPFS 
is silent on the question of whether principles in components of a 
grannnar other than the syntactic component can refer to phonological 
predicates, and unfortunately (as we point out in Pullum and Zwicky i984) 
the existence of a component of LIPs opens the door to analyses that use 
phonological reference in the LIP component to acbieve the effect of 
phonological determination in a lexically governed syntactic rule. As a 
result, the increased reliance on a rich set of LIPs (versus 
transformations or metat·ules) in lexicalist approaches to syntax is not 
unproblematic. We believe, however, that tbe spirit as well as the 
letter of the PPFS can be maintained here. 
3.1.2. Phonological ccaponents. We assume tbat phonology itself is 
articulated, comprising principles in a number of distinct components . 
However, as far as the PPFS is concerned, phonology could well be a 
single bomoge11eous co:mpone11t. The PPFS rules out phonological 
predicates, of any sort, in syntactic rules. 
Nevertheless, we cannot discuss examples in a theoretical vacuum. 
It is also conceivable (though, in our view, unlikely) that the PPFS 
could not be maintained in its full generality, in which case we would 
not want to admit phonological predicates of all sorts in syntactic 
rules, but would search for restrictions on tbe types of phonological 
representations that could play a role in syntax; an articulated 
phonology would serve as a natural source of potential restrictions. 
In any event, we follow Dressler (1985) in distinguishing 
sll0111orphy rules, involving pbonological operations as concomitants 
of morphological rules (whether derivational or inflectional), from 
•orphonologicsl rules, in which ge11eral phonological operations apply 
in morphosyntactic domains, and these in turn from (purely) 
phoriologicsl rules, in which general phonological operations apply in 
purely phonological, or "prosodic", domains. In addition, following 
Zwicky (1986), we distinguish a set of shape conditions that override 
allomol'phy rules and precede 111orphonological rules; among the shape 
conditions are those governing the well-for.medness of clitic groups. 
Though all the details of this proposal are iaportent, in the 
present context what is most significant is that these component 
distinctions uapose a sharp division of "phrase"-phonological rules into 
two types, a prosodically se11sitive group and a morphosyntactically 
sensitive group. This is essentially the division advocated by Rotenberg 
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(1978) and Hasegawa (1979) and defended in some detail by Kaisse (1985), 
who uses the terminology "rules of fast speech" (for automatic, 
prosodically sensitive rules of phrase phonology) versus "rules of 
connected speech" (for nonautomatic, morphosyutactically sensitive rules 
of phrase phonology). 
3.2. Analyzing apparent violations of the PPFS. A genuine 
violation of the PPFS would be a generalization about a language which is 
correctly expressed as a syntactic rule referring to phonological 
constructs. An apparent violation could then fail to be genuine on any 
of the following grounds: the generalization might be spurious (section 
3.2.1); a real generalization might involve not a rule, but rather a 
preference or tendency (3.2.2); a real generalization might involve a 
rule not of grammar, but rather of some extragran,matical domain (3. 2. 3) ; 
a rule of grWlllllar might be located not in the syntactic component, but 
rather in one of the other components discussed in section 3.1 (3.2.4); 
or a rule of grammar might be subject to a phonological condition or 
constraint that is universal, and therefore is not to be stated as part 
of the rule (3.2.5). 
3.2.1. Spurious generalizations. Occasionally in the literature it 
has been claimed that some syntactic rule is subject to a constraint 
involving the phonological properties of some morpheme, word, or 
constituent--hut on closer inspection it turns out that there is no real 
phonological conditioning whatsoever, that when the constraint is 
correctly described, it can be seen to arise from some essentially 
nonphonological basis. The generalization involving phonology is 
spurious. Sometimes a putative generalization vanishes completely wider 
scrutiny. 
Particularly susceptible to reanalysis in nonphonological terms, or 
to outright rejection, are "functional" accounts of syntactic and 
morphological pheno1oena. It is sometimes maintained, for instance, that 
some forms take the shape they do in order to achieve a one-to-one 
association between morphosyntactic categories aud their phonological 
realizations--that is, in order to avoid ambiguity and redundancy--and 
that this teleological statement involving phonology constitutes a 
sufficient description of the morphosyntactic facts. Both linguists 
(Durrell 1979) and language teachers (Eltzner and Radenhausen 1930, 22-3) 
have espoused versions of this proposal for the three adjective 
"declensions" in German. We sketch the facts briefly here; for a full 
treatment, see Zwicky (to appear, sec. 3.1). 
There are three paradigms for adjective inflection in German, 
traditionally called "strong," "weak," and "1oixed." The choice among 
them is governed by the determiner preceding the adjective. Indecliuable 
determiners (including the zero determiner) govern the strong declension, 
in which most of the 16 case/gender/number combinations are realized by 
distinct endings. Determiners in a second group (with nearly the same 
paradigm as the strong declension of adjectives) govern the weak 
declension, in which there is massive levelling in favor of only two 
endings, -e and - er1. Determiners in a third group (with zero 
endings for some combinations) govern the mixed declension, which has 
son,e endings from the strong declension and some from the weak. The 
paradig,o for the 1oixed declension can be roughly viewed as an trade-off 
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in information about case, gender, and number: if the determiner has an 
ending, the adjective doesn't need to supply any information, and so has 
a weak-declension ending; but if the <letenoiner lacks an ending, the 
adjective must supply information, and so has a strong-declension 
ending. The indefinite article ein governs the mixed declension, so 
tbat when it has au ending, as in the dative singular masculine 
eine111, a following adjective has a nondescript ending (-en); but 
when it lacks an ending, as in the nominative singular masculine ein, 
a following adjective has an informative ending (-er) • 
The question is what the granuoar of German says about these facts. 
Zwicky (to appear) formulates several versions of a principle requiring 
unambiguous and uureduudant phonological expression of case, gender, and 
nUJ11ber within German NPs an<l supplies counterexamples to all of them. 
Zwicky further observes that even if one of these versions had been free 
of counterexamples, it would still have been far too weak to predict the 
actual paradigms that German has and so would have no place as a rule in 
any component of gr8JIBaar. If we lower our sights and try to describe 
only the mixed declension, with the other two declensions as givens, it 
is possible to fonnulate a rule of allomorphy much as in the preceding 
paragraph, which will cover this narrow range of facts but doesn't 
mention ambiguity or redundancy: The ending of an adjective in the mixed 
declension is chosen from the strong paradigm if the preceding detenoiner 
has a zero ending, otherwise from the weak paradigm. It then turns out 
that the reference to the makeup of adjacent words and to (phonological) 
zero in this allomorphy rule are both dispensible. The following 
allomorphy rule covers the facts equally well: The ending of an adjective 
in the mixed declension is chosen from the strong paradigm in the 
nonfeminine nominative singular, otherwise from the weak paradigm. 
The fate of putative syntactic generalizations employing functional 
notions like ambiguity and redundancy is, in our experience, uniformly 
grim. (We considered another case in Zwicky and Pullum 1983, on 
Somali.) Those who advance such proposals are attempting to make rules 
of grenonar perform a task they are not equipped for: not only to describe 
some aspect of the sow1d-meaning pairing in a language, but also to 
encode directly their extragranuoatical reasons for being, to (so to 
speak) wear these reasons on their sleeves. This is to insist that form 
should not merely follow function, it should be function. It makes 
sense that grammars should contain rules that, individually or in 
concert, help inake sentences pronounceable, parsable, infonnative, 
reasonably brief, and _the like, hut there is no reason to think that we 
can tell what a rule is good for by looking at it wrenched from its 
grammar, and we believe it is always a mistake to formulate a rule 
explicitly in tenns of its functions. 
Cases of spurious generalization are often complex. In some, there 
is a correlation between a phonological property and the applicability of 
a rule, but this correlation is weak, constituting at best a tendency 
(see section 3.2.2). In some, the constraint not only is nonphonological 
hut also applies to a rule that helongs in some component other thau 
syntax (see section 3.2.4). On occasion, there are dialect differences, 
with one dialect failing to present a cow1terexSJ11ple to the PPFS because 
a phonological generalization is spurious and a second dialect failing to 
preseut a counterexample to the PPFS for a different reason. 
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Two cases fro111 English, one involving ditransitive verbs and the 
other combinations of verbs with particles, illustrate some of this 
complexity. These are treated in Zwicky and Pullum (1986). 
3.2.2. Preferences and tendencies. As we said in section 1.1, 
there are (at least) two ways in which a real generalization about 
linguistic events can fail to constitute a rule of grwrunar and so cannot 
possibly be a candidate for a phonological constraint on a syntactic 
rule. The first of these is that the generalization describes a 
preference (if we look at matters from the point of view of speakers) 
or a tendency (if we take a more neutral vie1ipoint). For instance, 
given two alternative expressions differing in length, speakers might 
prefer to use the shorter in most circumstances, thus following a 
principle of least effort, both for themselves and for their addressees. 
Or given two alternative expressions, one alliterative and the other not, 
speakers might tend not to use the alliterative version, thereby avoiding 
material that is difficult to pronounce. 
It is not necessary for a tendency to be explicable by reference to 
language production or comprehension, as these two (not entirely 
hypothetical) examples are. A statistical tendency favoring one class of 
fonns over another in certain circumstances can be a remnant of 
linguistic history, subject to diachronic but not synchronic explanation; 
see our discussion of Dative Movement verbs in Zwicky and Pullwn (1986). 
We argue there that if there were any tendency for these verbs to be 
either monosyllables or initially stressed disyllables, such a tendency 
would be sufficiently explained by reference to the historical sources of 
the verbs. From a synchronic point of view, any such tendency would be an 
accident. There would be no reason to think that it played a role in 
language production or comprehension, and certainly no reason to think 
that it should be expressed in a rule of grammar. 
In section 1.1 we mentioned a third source of tendencies favoring 
one class of expressions over ruiother: structured variability in language 
use. The first lesson of quantitative sociolinguistics is that 
linguistic variables are often correlated (in the statistical sense) with 
social, situational, and personality variables, as well as with one 
auother. Particular groups of speakers can then be characterized 
sociolinguistically by their base settings on certain linguistic 
variables (expressed as estimated probabilities) plus their pattern of 
correlations among var.iables (expressed as a system of formulas each 
relating the probabilities for several variables); see Weiner and Labov 
(1983) for an illustration of the method applied to agentless passives in 
English. What interests us here is the occurrence of correlations between 
linguistic variables. We take particular note of the possibility that 
the applicability of a syntactic rule might be correlated with some 
phonological variable--that, say, topicalization might be favored for 
polysyllabic NPs over monosyllabic NPs. 
There are actually two ways in which this correlation might be 
established. The first is that each of the linguistic variables might be 
dependent on some nonlinguistic variable and covary as a result. For 
instance, in some group increasing age might predict higher frequencies 
for both topicalization and polysyllabicity. There might then be a 
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tendency for polysyllabic NPs to topicalize and/or a tendency for 
topicalization to affect polysyllabic NPs. But a sociolinguistic 
description of language use would have no reason to 1nention any such 
tendencies in the speech of this group, and neither of course would a 
grammar for their dialect. 
The second possibility is that the correlation between variables 
might be irreducible and so require explicit representation in a 
sociolinguistic description of language use, as a statement relating 
polysyllabicity, topicalizability, and other factors. A tendency would 
then have found expression as a principle in an extragrammatical domain . 
We do not know whether there are any real-life instantiations of 
this possibility. For one thing, the methods of quautitative 
sociolinguistics are not designed to distinguish causes and effects 
within a set of variables; a probability formula merely describes a 
matheinatical relationship among many factors, both linguistic and 
uoulinguistic, and it cannot be taken seriously as a principle in a 
sociolinguistic description of language use. Such a principle should 
describe a linguistic practice, should describe what speakers know about 
how and when to use some element of linguistic form. It should say, for 
exmople, what speakers know about using the word steed or what they 
know about using topicalized sentences. But to our knowledge, no 
precise, unified, and colllprehensive theory of such principles exists (in 
the way that precise, unified, and comprehensive theories of syntax 
exist). As a result, there is no sensible way to address the question of 
what some subset of these principles might be like. We do not rule out 
the possibility that one of these principles says that some syntactic 
construction is especially favored when it has certain phonological 
properties. Needless to say, we canuot rely on this possibility in 
reanalyzing putative violations of the PPFS. 
We have uncovered at least three sources of statistical tendencies 
in linguistic behavior: speaker preferences based on extragraJmnatical 
considerations, including production, comprehension, and style; residues 
of linguistic history; and structured sociolinguistic variability. In 
all three cases, explanations for the tendencies are to be sought 
outside l{rBlll/llsr, in accounts of language use or diachronic change. 
We use this fact when we classify some phenomenon as a tendency or 
preference rather than a rule or a condition on a rule; we intend that 
every such classification should be backed by a reference to an 
extragrammatical consideration that can provide a sufficient explanation 
for the phenomenon at hand. We do not claim that every statistical 
tendency in linguistic behavior has a discoverable extragr8Jlllllatical 
explanation. But we are not willing to dispose of putative 
counterexamples to the PPFS (and other interfacing assw,aptions) by facile 
references to "mere tendencies." 
The problem arises when we have to distinguish a (statistical) 
tendency from a rule with exceptions that must be characterized by the 
gra1J1mar. Suppose we are confronted with the observation that certain 
instances of a construction do not occur (in speech or in texts), or that 
infonnants find them unacceptable. There are three possible 
interpretations: either the unacceptable data are to be treated as 
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ungrammatical, and they are to be described as systematic exceptions to 
the rule describing the construction, via a condition on the rule; or the 
unacceptable data are to be treated as ungrammatical, but the exceptions 
are to be listed, and any similarities among tbem reflect mere 
tendencies; or the data are unacceptable because they are victims of some 
tendency favoring alten1ative expressions. The second interpretation is 
the one we use in our discussion of Dative Movement and verbs taJcing 
particles. The third interpretation is the one we propose to appeal to 
in, for instance, discussions of the unacceptability of adverbs like 
friendlily and sentences like They gave a fight that now seemed to 
them utterly without hope of success up. In both interpretations, the 
appeal to tendencies must be backed by a sketch of relevant 
extragranonatical considerations. 
3.2.3. Ext~tical generalizations. A real generalization 
about linguistic events can fail to constitute a rule of grammar because 
it describes a preference or tendency. It can also fail, as we noted in 
section 1.1, because it describes a linguistic practice (however 
rule-governed) in some domain other than grammar. As in the case of 
preferences and tendencies, if the generalization is not a rule of 
grammar, a fortiori it is not a possible candidate for a phonological 
constraint on a syntactic rule. The extragrammatical domain that has 
most often been confounded with grammar is the realm of verbal play and 
verbal art. There are principles in this doJOain which do in fact refer 
to phonological properties of morphological and syntactic units--the 
"rules" of language games (like Pig Latin) and poetic forms (like the 
sonnet). These phenomena have considerable import for a theory of 
phonology and perhaps for theories of other components of grammar as 
well. But they have nothing to do with the PPFS or the other interfacing 
asswoptions, since they are not rules of grammar. 
3.2.4. Honsyntactic rules. Even if a generalization genuinely 
involves phonology, and even if is to be formulated as a rule of grammar, 
rather than as a tendency or as a regularity in some extragr8Dllllatical 
domain, it might still be beside the point in an examination of the PPFS 
because it is not a rule of syntax, but belongs instead in some other 
coruponeut of grammar. It might, for instance, be a "phonological" rule 
(of one sort or another) with a syntactic constraint on it, rather than 
the reverse, or it might be a rule of morphology or a shape condition. 
In such a case the existence of a phonological condition on the rule has 
no bearing on the PPFS. 
3.2.5. Universals. A final possibility is that there is a 
phonological condition on some syntactic rule, but that the condition is 
supplied by universal grammar, not stipulated parochially. Individual 
grammars have no choice in the matter. We are willing to entertain such 
circwnscribed phonological constraints on syntactic rules because (unlike 
parochial constraints of this sort) they involve no increase in the 
expressive power of grammars. As it happens, universal constraints like 
this are more than a hypothetical possibility; see the discussion in 
Pullum and Zwicky (in press) of a universal condition on coordinate 
structures which refers to phonological identity. 
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Notes 
*This bulk of this article was written at the Center for the Study 
of Language and Information, Stanford Uuiversity, iu July and August 
1984; a version will be incorporated into our book, The 
Syntax-Phonology Interface (to be published by Academic Press). Our 
thanks to the System Development Foundation for its financial support.
1see Zwicky (1984) for an extended discussion of the ideas in this 
section. 
2we do not iu fact think it is correct to say that the theory of 
Chomsky (1965) entails this strict separation, though it was probably 
intended to; see section 2 of Pullum and Zwicky (1984).
3It seems likely that it was also an unnecessary weakening; see Katz 
(1980) for a critique of Chomsky's treatment of the syntax-semantics 
interface. 
4It is therefore surprising to us that Chomsky and Lasnik (1977, 
427) say 
Even this extremely rich theory [of Peters and Ritchie 
(1973)--GKP/AMZ] does not encompass such devices as 
structure-building rules, global rules, transderivational 
constraints, and others that have been proposed. Any 
enrichment of linguistic theory that extends the class of 
possible granonars requires strong empirical motivation. We 
feel that this is lacking in the case of devices that exceed 
the frmnework of Chomsky (1955), Peters and Ritchie (1973), 
and comparable work ... 
But the point is that there can in principle be no empirical motivation: 
no facts about the class of languages could speak either for or against a 
proposed extension of the class of grammars these theories define. 
5The term is due to Sampson (1973). 
6rhe terminology in the literature on grammatical modularity and 
cognitive modularity is confused, with the words Jllodularityand 
autoIJQ/IIY used in different ways by different authors in their 
discussions of granunars and of cognitive models. We advocate using both 
terms in both contexts, inteudiug thereby a distinction hetween the 
existence of modules and their distinctness. 
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